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GUNS, ORIGINALISM, AND CULTURAL COGNITION 
Jamal Greene* 
“Of course, the risk of assessing evolving standards is that it is all too easy 
to believe that evolution has culminated in one’s own views.”1 
 
In a legal regime whose canonical text is Marbury v. Madison,2 it 
should be unremarkable that the Supreme Court’s actions are 
bounded rather severely by public opinion.  What makes the proposi-
tion remarkable—enough to be well worth Barry Friedman’s time3—
is also what makes Marbury remarkable:  namely, that judges so often 
go out of their way to deny it.  Though not unheard of, it is rare for a 
judge to advertise that the content of a constitutional rule she is an-
nouncing is motivated by public opinion.  Such an admission would 
be self-defeating, since it invites the charge that she has stepped out-
side of her role.  If public opinion determines the content of consti-
tutional rules, then it is more difficult to defend our collective choice 
of judges rather than politicians or social scientists as constitutional 
caretakers. 
The notion that judges legitimately respond to public opinion is a 
particularly difficult concession for those who deny that the meaning 
of the Constitution evolves over time.  If Friedman’s hypothesis is 
correct, it seems to put such judges to an uncomfortable choice be-
tween self-denial and public deception, between turning “faint-
hearted” or being disingenuous.4  One faced with a professed inter-
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 1 Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 865 (1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 2 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). 
 3 BARRY FREIDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE:  HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE 
SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 4 Justice Scalia has famously called himself a “faint-hearted” originalist, based both on his 
commitment to stare decisis and on his presumed reluctance to adhere to an original 
understanding that conflicted diametrically with contemporary values.  See Antonin Sca-
lia, Originalism:  The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849, 861–64 (1989) (“I cannot imagine 
myself, any more than any other federal judge, upholding a statute that imposes the pu-
nishment of flogging.”).  At least one prominent originalist scholar has argued that Sca-
lia’s originalism is undeserving of the label.  See Randy E. Barnett, Scalia’s Infidelity:  A Cri-
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pretivist whose rulings appear to track evolving public opinion is 
tempted to invoke Judge Larry Fidler’s exasperated plea to Sara Jane 
Olson:  “Were you lying to me then or are you lying to me now?”5 
This brief article seeks to resist the temptation in the particular 
context of originalism and gun rights.  When the Supreme Court 
held in District of Columbia v. Heller that the Second Amendment pro-
tects an individual right to carry a handgun for self-defense, the 
longstanding marriage between guns and originalism was finally con-
summated.6  The majority’s unapologetic devotion to originalism has 
been well-documented.7  On its face, Justice Scalia’s opinion for the 
Court rests on a contested assumption about interpretation that he 
has spent much of his public life defending:  namely, that the original 
meaning of constitutional text controls modern interpretation, even 
if that meaning has come unmoored from the purpose behind codi-
fication or is inconsistent with contemporary public values.  Since the 
Second Amendment declares its ends in its preamble—“A well regu-
lated militia, being necessary to the security of a free State”8—the Hel-
ler Court’s disregard of purpose in favor of original meaning could 
not have been more transparent.9 
At the same time, Heller was consistent with the prevailing political 
winds.  A CNN poll conducted three weeks before the decision was 
announced found that two-thirds of Americans believed that the lan-
guage of the Second Amendment protects an individual right to own 
a gun rather than a collective right to form a militia.10  A more recent 
 
tique of “Faint-Hearted” Originalism, 75 U. CIN. L. REV. 7, 13 (2006) (concluding that “Jus-
tice Scalia is simply not an originalist”). 
  5  Anna Gorman, Olsen’s Attempt to Change Plea Fails, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 4, 2001, at 1. 
 6 Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783 (2008). 
 7 See Jamal Greene, Selling Originalism, 97 GEO. L.J. 657, 682–89 (2009) (discussing use of 
originalism in Heller); Reva B. Siegel, Dead or Alive:  Originalism as Popular Constitutionalism 
in Heller, 122 HARV. L. REV. 191, 191 (2008) (noting that many have viewed Heller as “the 
‘Triumph of Originalism’”); J. Harvie Wilkinson III, Of Guns, Abortions, and the Unraveling 
Rule of Law, 95 VA. L. REV. 253, 256–57 (2009) (“Whereas once legal conservatism de-
manded that judges justify decisions by reference to a number of restraining principles, 
Heller requires that they only make originalist arguments supporting their preferred 
view.”).   
 8 U.S. CONST. amend. II. 
 9 See Randy E. Barnett, News Flash:  The Constitution Means What It Says, WALL ST. J., June 27, 
2008, at A13 (calling Heller “the finest example of what is now called ‘original public 
meaning’ jurisprudence ever adopted by the Supreme Court.”).  But see Nelson Lund, The 
Second Amendment, Heller, and Originalist Jurisprudence, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1343, 1345 
(2009) (“[T]he Court’s reasoning is at critical points so defective—and in some respects 
so transparently non-originalist—that Heller should be seen as an embarrassment for 
those who joined the majority opinion.”). 
 10 CNN/Opinion Research Corp. Poll, June 4–5, 2008, available at 
http://www.pollingreport.com/guns.htm. 
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survey conducted by Stephen Ansolabehere, Nathaniel Persily, and 
me in July 2009 found that 82 percent of Americans agreed (and 52 
percent “strongly” agreed) that an individual should have a right to 
keep a registered handgun at home.11  The Court’s decision earned 
the endorsement of both major Presidential candidates at the time,12 
and the majority opinion, conspicuously and without explanation, 
exempted some of the most popular gun control laws from its reach.13  
For those reasons, it is tempting simply to regard Heller as further 
proof of Robert Dahl’s enduring thesis—recently updated by Fried-
man—that “the policy views dominant on the Court are never for 
long out of line with the policy views dominant among the lawmaking 
majorities of the United States.”14  On this account, dressing the Heller 
opinion in historical garb is but one of many possible legitimation 
strategies that the Court regularly employs to sustain the illusion of a 
divide between law and politics. 
We need not abandon this account, or the insights of positive po-
litical science more generally, in order to pose interesting questions 
about the Court’s choice of methodology.  An originalist opinion was 
not the only possible route to Heller’s holding, and it may not even 
have been the most persuasive one.  The fear animating the Second 
Amendment at its inception was not overly aggressive crime control 
by the federal government, but rather federal displacement of state 
militias.15  It is true that, as Justice Scalia recognized in Heller, and as 
the Court held last Term in McDonald v. City of Chicago,16 the Second 
Amendment was widely conceptualized in individual-right terms by 
 
 11 See KNOWLEDGE NETWORKS, FIELD REPORT:  CONSTITUTIONAL ATTITUDES SURVEY 58 
(2010) (on file with author). 
 12 See Mike Dorning, Obama Hedges on Gun Ruling:  Republicans Accuse Candidate of “Flip-Flop,” 
CHI. TRIB., June 27, 2008, at 20 (reporting John McCain’s response that the ruling was “a 
landmark victory for 2nd Amendment freedom” and Barack Obama’s statement that he 
has “always believed that the 2nd Amendment protects the right of individuals to bear 
arms”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 13 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2816–17 (2008) (“[N]othing in our opi-
nion should be taken to cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of 
firearms by felons and the mentally ill, or laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sen-
sitive places such as schools and government buildings, or laws imposing conditions and 
qualifications on the commercial sale of arms.”). 
 14 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy:  The Supreme Court as a National Policy-
maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 285 (1957); cf. FRIEDMAN, supra, note 3.  But see PUBLIC OPINION 
AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTROVERSY (Nathaniel Persily et al. eds., 2008) (chronicling the 
disparity between public opinion and Supreme Court decisions in a range of areas). 
 15 See David Thomas Konig, The Second Amendment:  A Missing Transatlantic Context for the His-
torical Meaning of “the Right of the People to Keep and Bear Arms,” 22 L. & HIST. REV. 119, 142 
(2004) (discussing the fear of who would staff and control state militias present in state 
ratifying conventions and in Congress). 
 16 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
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the dawn of the Civil War.17  But the Heller majority’s effort to describe 
the Second Amendment in those terms as of 1791 was anachronistic 
and put considerable strain on the Court’s reasoning.  Of course, Jus-
tice Scalia and Justice Thomas are both on record as advocating an 
originalist interpretive approach, and so Heller was not an obvious oc-
casion to abandon it, but the other three Justices in the majority are 
not originalists.  Chief Justice Roberts, Justice Alito, or (most readily) 
Justice Kennedy could have acknowledged without embarrassment 
that their reading of the Second Amendment derived from an evolu-
tion in constitutional values.18  Yet Roberts declined to assign the ma-
jority opinion to a nonoriginalist, and none of the Justices in the ma-
jority wrote separately to express disagreement with any aspect of 
Justice Scalia’s opinion. 
This Article argues that originalism’s stubborn hold on pro-gun 
rights arguments may not be direct, but may instead result in part 
from a shared cultural orientation between originalist and gun rights 
proponents.  That is, the appeal of deploying originalist arguments to 
establish a right to carry a gun may not derive from an independently 
persuasive account of the history of the Second Amendment.  Rather, 
I suggest, the appeal of originalist arguments in this context derives 
in part from the shared cultural values of those to whom both origi-
nalist and gun rights arguments appeal.  The cultural orientation that 
predicts attitudes in favor of gun rights significantly overlaps with the 
one that predicts attitudes in favor of originalism.  The complex po-
litical process through which both gun rights and originalism have 
been pitched to the American public over the last quarter century has 
accordingly availed itself of a bond between the two sets of ideas that 
resists empirical deconstruction.  Originalism is the preferred me-
thodology, not because it supplies the best arguments, a priori, in fa-
vor of constitutional gun rights, but because it supplies the most re-
sonant interpretive language through which gun rights proponents 
discuss the Constitution. 
 
 17 See id. at 3038 (“By the 1850’s, the perceived threat that had prompted the inclusion of 
the Second Amendment in the Bill of Rights—the fear that the National Government would 
disarm the universal militia—had largely faded as a popular concern, but the right to 
keep and bear arms was highly valued for purposes of self-defense.”); Heller, 128 S. Ct. at 
2807 (“The 19th-century cases that interpreted the Second Amendment universally sup-
port an individual right unconnected to militia service.”); David B. Kopel, The Second 
Amendment in the Nineteenth Century, 1998 BYU L. REV. 1359, 1447–54 (1998) (noting 
statements of this time period referred to the Second Amendment as an individual right). 
 18 See Jamal Greene, Heller High Water?  The Future of Originalism, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 
325, 341–42 (2009) (stating that neither Chief Justice Roberts nor Justice Alito has dem-
onstrated strong originalist tendencies). 
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My argument draws primarily on two bodies of research.  First is 
the work of Dan Kahan and Donald Braman applying cultural theory 
to the debate over gun control.  Kahan and Braman have argued in a 
series of articles that individual support for or opposition to gun con-
trol is motivated by differences in cultural worldviews.19  To wit, indi-
viduals holding hierarchical and individualistic worldviews are far 
more likely to oppose gun control than individuals with respectively 
contrasting worldviews.  Kahan and Braman argue further that the 
contribution of cultural orientation to policy views is such that indi-
viduals will inevitably evaluate relevant empirical evidence in accor-
dance with, rather than independent of, those orientations.20  One 
need not adopt the strong position—apparently endorsed by Kahan 
and Braman—that culture is entirely prior to empirical observation 
to believe, as I will argue, that the link between gun rights and origi-
nalism is difficult to break through even the most conscientious his-
torical argument. 
The second body of work I draw upon is the original survey re-
search referenced earlier.  In a series of surveys conducted in July 
2009 and in June and July 2010, Ansolabehere, Persily, and I asked 
Americans about their views on constitutional interpretation, on spe-
cific constitutional issues, and on social and cultural questions.  Our 
findings are reported more fully in a separate article,21 but as relevant 
here we found that morally traditionalist and libertarian cultural 
orientations were highly significant predictors of a belief in original-
ism, predictive at higher confidence levels and yielding larger stan-
dardized coefficients than party identification, race, gender, or edu-
cation level.  In light of these findings, it seems that divorcing the gun 
rights argument from originalism may require much more than a his-
tory lesson. 
 
 19 See Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, More Statistics, Less Persuasion:  A Cultural Theory of 
Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1291, 1292 (2003) (discussing the influence of in-
dividuals’ cultural worldviews on their positions on gun control).  Much of Kahan and 
Braman’s work in this area is compiled at The Cultural Cognition Project at Yale Law 
School, available at http://www.culturalcognition.net. 
 20 See id.; see also Donald Braman, Dan M. Kahan & James Grimmelmann, Modeling Facts, 
Culture, and Cognition in the Gun Debate, 18 SOC. J. RES. 283, 285 (2005) (“Through an 
overlapping set of psychological and cultural mechanisms, individuals adopt the factual 
beliefs that are dominant among persons who share their cultural orientations.”). 
 21 See Jamal Greene, Nathaniel Persily & Stephen Ansolabehere, Profiling Originalism, 111 
COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2011) (manuscript on file with author). 
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I 
Cultural theorists believe that individual perceptions of risk are 
based largely on individual cultural worldviews.  Culturally contingent 
moral presuppositions shape our assessment of which among compet-
ing sets of risks deserve our consideration and attention.  In their 
landmark study, Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky theorized that 
human culture is differentiated primarily along two dimensions:  a 
“group” dimension that reports relative levels of normative affinity for 
collective moral pressure, and a “grid” dimension that reports one’s 
relative comfort with prescriptive social classification.  If we view each 
dimension as binary, we can identify four ideal types of cultural 
orientation:  low group, low grid (“individualists”); low group, high 
grid (“fatalists”); high group, low grid (“egalitarian”); and high 
group, high grid (“hierarchical”).22 
Individualists are libertarian and unsentimental, favoring robust 
competition over resources between diverse individuals unregulated 
either by central planning authority or prescriptive social norms.  
The fatalist cedes the enforcement of social norms across fixed status 
categories but resists group solidarity or identification.  The egalita-
rian seeks to minimize differences in distributive outcomes, which 
might require strong government in the economic and political 
realm, but wishes to maximize opportunities for individual flourish-
ing in the face of competing social norms, which might require weak 
government in the realm of public morality.  The hierarchically-
oriented, by contrast, is deferential to order and authority, both polit-
ical and social.  Roughly, egalitarian and hierarchical orientations dif-
fer across the dimension of social ordering (favoring economic and 
political ordering), and individualistic and fatalistic orientations dif-
fer across the dimension of economic and political ordering (oppos-
ing social ordering). 
Kahan and Braman have spent the better part of a decade apply-
ing the cultural theory of risk to individual views on gun control.  
Drawing on the work of Douglas and Wildavsky, Karl Dake,23 Ellen Pe-
 
 22 MARY DOUGLAS & AARON WILDAVSKY, RISK AND CULTURE:  AN ESSAY ON THE SELECTION OF 
TECHNOLOGICAL AND ENVIRONMENTAL DANGERS (1982) (discussing individuals’ capabili-
ties for assessing risk). 
 23 Karl Dake, Orienting Dispositions in the Perception of Risk:  An Analysis of Contemporary 
Worldviews and Cultural Biases, 22 J. CROSS-CULTURAL PSYCHOL. 61, 62 (1999) (arguing 
that mental models of risk are not solely matters of individual cognition, but also corres-
pond to worldviews entailing deeply held beliefs and values regarding society, its func-
tioning, and its potential fate). 
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ters, and Paul Slovic,24 and on their own statistical analysis based on 
General Social Survey (GSS) data from 1988–2000, Kahan and Bra-
man conclude that egalitarian and “solidaristic”25 worldviews predict 
support for gun control, while hierarchical and individualistic 
worldviews predict opposition to gun control.26  This is consistent with 
many of our intuitions and with Kahan and Braman’s predicted re-
sults.  In the American psyche, guns are symbols of masculinity and 
honor.  For many, guns also connote state regulation of social non-
conformists and “out” groups through violence both public—military 
and police forces—and private—lynchings, domestic violence, and 
hate crimes.  At the same time, American gun culture valorizes self-
reliance, as it is associated with hunting, with local as against federal 
authority, and with protection of home and hearth more generally.  
Our own research suggests (though with some notable ambiguity) 
that individuals who generally express satisfaction with the current 
level of equality in society and who believe in limited government are 
more likely to favor individual gun rights, controlling for demograph-
ic variation. 
Standing alone, then, Kahan and Braman’s findings are not wildly 
controversial.  They leverage their observations into the more pro-
vocative claim, however, that cultural commitments precede and, in-
deed, commandeer data-based judgments about risk to such a degree 
that facts cannot change minds about gun control.  This is in part be-
cause facts have the perverse, and exclusive, effect of reinforcing the 
views of those who need no convincing:  “While predictably failing to 
change anyone’s mind, empirical analyses do reinforce the conviction 
of those who already accept their conclusions that a rational and just 
 
 24 Ellen Peters & Paul Slovic, The Role of Affect and Worldviews as Orienting Dispositions in the 
Perception and Acceptance of Nuclear Power, 26 J. APPLIED SOC. PSYCHOL. 1427, 1428 (1996) 
(noting that a person’s “affective reaction” to a risk influences their cognitive perception 
of the risk). 
 25 Kahan and Braman use “solidaristic” rather than “fatalist,” presumably because it better 
resonates and because they wish to emphasize the “group” dimension along which the 
individualist-solidaristic scale varies.  See Kahan & Braman, supra note 18, at 1291. 
 26 It is important to note that Kahan and Braman’s study designs coded responses along two 
distinct scales:  a hierarchy-egalitarianism scale and an individualism-solidarism scale, the 
first roughly measuring views on social ordering and the second measuring views on polit-
ical and economic ordering.  Their results suggest that we can expect those who favor so-
cial ordering, ceteris paribus, to favor gun rights, and those who favor political and eco-
nomic ordering, ceteris paribus, to favor gun control.  As I understand Kahan and 
Braman’s study, then, hierarchists might be more likely than egalitarians to oppose gun 
control, but we cannot say whether they are more or less likely to favor it than solidarists 
or individualists.  For my purposes, this nomenclature is less important than the method 
through which populations are identified.  See id. 
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assessment of the facts must support their position.”27  Kahan and 
Braman’s data-driven (and therefore ironic) skepticism about the 
utility of empirical facts in resolving normative debate has prompted 
intense criticism which they have on various occasions sought to re-
but.28  For now, my concern is not with their thesis in its strongest var-
iation.  Let it suffice for our purposes that our cultural orientations 
will cause us to resist historical or social facts that point towards a 
competing risk assessment.  This intuition is consistent with familiar 
accounts of cognitive dissonance.29 
II 
Judicial review is risky business.  Constitutional theorists do not 
customarily describe the various modalities of interpretation in terms 
of competing bundles of risk, but they might.  Judicial review in the 
United States entails a delegation of decision-making authority over 
constitutive matters of political life to elites who enjoy effective life 
tenure, who do not stand for election, and who purport to be guided 
by a two centuries-old document.  Consider two possible approaches 
to interpretation of unclear constitutional language within such a re-
gime.  Under the first approach, a judge considers herself con-
strained by the set of applications that a learned man at the time of 
ratification would reasonably have ascribed to the text in his own 
time. Under the second approach, the judge considers herself bound 
by the principles immanent within the text and must apply them dy-
namically, as her own assessment of their modern application directs. 
 
 27 Kahan & Braman, supra note 19, at 1321. 
 28 See Philip J. Cook & Jens Ludwig, Fact-Free Gun Policy?, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1329, 1329 
(2003) (arguing that while cultural worldviews may influence individuals’ feelings about 
gun control, so does evidence on consequences of gun use); Gertrud M. Fremling & John 
R. Lott, Jr., The Surprising Finding that “Cultural Worldviews” Don’t Explain People’s Views on 
Gun Control, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1341, 1341 (2003) (arguing that facts and evidence, in ad-
dition to cultural worldviews, affect individuals’ feelings about gun control); David B. 
Mustard, Culture Affects Our Beliefs About Firearms, But Data Are Also Important, 151 U. PA. L. 
REV. 1387, 1387 (2003) (arguing that data as well as culture affect beliefs about firearms).  
But cf. Dan M. Kahan & Donald Braman, Caught in the Crossfire:  A Defense of the Cultural 
Theory of Gun-Risk Perceptions, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1395, 1396 (2003) (responding to critics’ 
emphasis on the importance of data in determining gun-control opinions by reemphasiz-
ing the importance of cultural worldviews); Braman, Kahan & Grimmelmann, supra note 
19. 
 29 See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE 3 (1957) (arguing that cogni-
tive dissonance is psychologically uncomfortable and will motivate an individual to reduce 
dissonance and achieve consonance, and that cognitive dissonance will lead to individuals 
avoiding situations and information which will likely increase the dissonance). 
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The risks attending each approach are familiar.  Under the first 
approach, there are linguistic difficulties with ascertaining the mean-
ing of text to fictional individuals in an age before American dictio-
naries.  There are public choice problems of distilling collective mo-
tivations, intentions, and understandings into pronouncements 
featuring the certitude required of legal authority.  Not least, identify-
ing constitutional meaning with the views of slaveholders and of men 
who otherwise held women, Indian tribes, and commoners in low re-
gard can (to understate) be alienating.  Under the second approach, 
however, elite values risk supplanting public values and may depend 
as much on the various and shifting commitments of the swing Justice 
as on those of any democratically responsible institution.  These bun-
dles of risk are not randomly appreciated; they will be differentially 
salient across the population, and we have every reason to suspect 
they are driven by culture. 
We can go some way towards demonstrating that empirically.  We 
asked several originalism-related questions in our surveys.  For exam-
ple, we asked the following, which duplicates a series of questions 
asked by the Quinnipiac Polling Institute from 2003 to 2008, and 
again in 2010:  “Which comes closer to your point of view?  1) In 
making decisions, the Supreme Court should only consider the origi-
nal intentions of the authors of the Constitution; 2) In making deci-
sions, the Supreme Court should consider changing times and cur-
rent realities in applying the principles of the Constitution.”  In order 
to mitigate any anomalies resulting from the wording of that ques-
tion, however, we also asked, for example, whether “[t]he Supreme 
Court should focus less on what the Constitution meant when it was 
written and more on the affect its decisions will have in today’s Amer-
ica,” and whether “[t]he Supreme Court should read the Constitu-
tion as a general set of principles whose meaning changes over 
time.”30  We used principal component factor analysis to construct an 
index that roughly measures one’s degree of affinity for originalism.  
This index then became our dependent variable of greatest interest. 
One might lodge a familiar objection to our survey results, and to 
survey data on popular attitudes towards courts more generally.  It is 
clear that most Americans devote little attention to courts most of the 
time, and it would be surprising indeed to learn that phrases like 
“original intentions” register more than a superficial degree of com-
 
 30 Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 21 (manuscript at 9). 
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prehension for most Americans.31  We take this objection not to be 
that Americans do not understand what they are being asked, but ra-
ther that they do not understand what follows from their answers.  
That is, ordinary citizens appreciate the conceptual distinction be-
tween the options posed but lack the epistemic tools to cash out what 
their answers portend substantively.  If, as it is reasonable to suppose, 
people care about substantive constitutional outcomes at least as 
much as they do methodology, then one might conclude that res-
ponses may easily be manipulated through substantive framing.  How 
would results change, for example, were we to reveal to respondents 
that the framers of the Equal Protection Clause were comfortable 
with affirmative action but uncomfortable with gender equality or in-
tegrated public schools? 
We take up this objection at greater length in our fuller treatment 
of these data.  The use of factor analysis reduces framing effects that 
might be particular to a question’s wording.  More broadly, the 
strength of the criticism depends on the use to which one wishes to 
put the data.  I do not believe we could responsibly use our study as 
proof, or even as reliable evidence, that more Americans agree with 
Justice Breyer than with Justice Scalia on constitutional interpreta-
tion, or even that a substantial number of Americans agree with ei-
ther.  The question they or other informed lawyers or academics are 
answering is different than the one most people are answering.  We 
take as a starting point that most respondents do not appreciate the 
implications of their answer for the substantive decisionmaking of the 
Supreme Court.  Nor do we assume, however, that a particular choice 
of methodology—particularly at the level of generality of our study—
has any necessary implications for substantive constitutional deci-
sionmaking.  Our hypothesis is that methodological choices are sa-
lient within the public consciousness,32 and that rhetoric about me-
thodology is a political commodity;33 our modest aim is to assess how 
 
 31 See generally MICHAEL X. DELLI CARPINI & SCOTT KEETER, WHAT AMERICANS KNOW ABOUT 
POLITICS AND WHY IT MATTERS 62–104 (1996) (arguing that what Americans know about 
politics involves a complicated set of questions and answers); Frederick Schauer, The Su-
preme Court 2005 Term, Foreword:  The Court’s Agenda—and the Nation’s, 120 HARV. L. REV. 4, 
12–32 (2006) (cataloging the large conceptual distance between the public agenda and 
the agenda of the Supreme Court).  But see JAMES L. GIBSON & GREGORY A. CALDEIRA, 
CITIZENS, COURTS, AND CONFIRMATIONS:  POSITIVITY THEORY AND THE JUDGMENTS OF THE 
AMERICAN PEOPLE 17 (2009) (arguing that the evidence of public ignorance about courts 
is weak). 
 32 The number of people answering “don’t know” to the Quinnipac questions was consis-
tently in the single digits.  See Greene, Persily, & Ansolabehere, supra note 21 (manuscript 
at 7).  This is probative of, though not identical to, salience. 
 33 See generally Greene, supra note 7. 
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the responses triggered by those choices differ across demographic 
and cultural space.34 
In order to identify the cultural orientations of our respondents, 
we replicated a series of “values” questions that have been asked in 
the American National Elections Studies.  Six of the questions probed 
views on relative levels of equality; four spoke to moral traditionalism; 
and three pairs of options explored views on the appropriate size of 
government.35  Using factor analysis, we developed three indices:  an 
“egalitarian” index, a “moral traditionalism” index, and a “govern-
ment size” index.  Our basic model is an ordinary least squares re-
gression with the originalism index as the dependent variable.36  The 
model includes a number of standard demographic variables, in ad-
dition to views on specific issues such as abortion, same-sex marriage, 
and gun rights.37 
Our moral traditionalism factor and our government size factor 
were both significant at the .05 level.  The moral traditionalism index 
also produced one of our largest standardized coefficients, suggesting 
not only confidence in its significance but substantive effects of a rel-
atively large magnitude.  Our egalitarianism factors did not achieve 
significance.38 
Several theoretical explanations might support the moral tradi-
tionalism result.  Most obviously, moral traditionalists resist accom-
modation of changes in moral standards, a risk obviated by adhe-
rence to original intentions and exacerbated by permitting social 
elites to adjust the Constitution to “changing times and current reali-
ties.”  Less obviously, perhaps, moral traditionalists may be less likely 
than their opposites to be skeptical of claims of absolute truth or to 
accept pluralism.  That attitude might plausibly affect not only their 
views of morality but also their views of language.  The notion that 
the same language can have radically different and yet equally valid 
meanings for different people at the same time may be harder to 
swallow for those with hierarchical rather than egalitarian orienta-
tions. 
 
 34 We would also note that the cognitive objection is not limited to questions about courts, 
but could be lodged as to virtually any complex policy view.  The efficacy of push polling, 
for example, does not mean that political polling is useless for all purposes, or even for its 
most useful purpose (predicting election results). 
 35 See infra Appendix A. 
 36 Logistic regression analysis generates similar patterns of significance, but does not permit 
use of an agreed-upon standardization of coefficients. 
 37 F-tests were used to test the joint insignificance of omitted variables. 
 38 Greene, Persily & Ansolabehere, supra note 21 (manuscript at 37–38). 
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It is more difficult to say with confidence why libertarians would 
tend towards originalism, but at least two possibilities recommend 
themselves.  First, originalism and libertarianism are both expressive-
ly linked to constitutional valorization.  Glorifying the Constitution is 
not a conceptual requirement of either libertarianism or originalism, 
but both conventionally associate themselves with the document and 
celebrate its fundamental goodness.39  Second, an orientation towards 
self-reliance might lead one to regard deference to the value choices 
of elites with suspicion.  Libertarianism and democracy are some-
times thought to be opposed, as in discussions of the countermajori-
tarian dilemma, but there is a strand of American libertarianism that 
better resembles localism.  Indeed, our government-size questions are 
more likely to tease out this orientation than conventional liberta-
rianism.  The government-size factor identifies those who would ra-
ther political and social authority rest with local insiders than with 
elite outsiders.  Limiting the Constitution to its original expectations 
is a means of retaining popular control over political decisionmaking.  
As Robert Bork writes, “the attempt to adhere to the principles ac-
tually laid down in the historic Constitution will mean that entire 
ranges of problems and issues are placed off-limits for judges.”40 
III 
As others have remarked, the proliferation of originalist argu-
ments in favor of an individual rights view of the Second Amendment 
is a genuine paradox in light of the relative strength of non-
originalist arguments supporting the same position.41  Justice Scalia 
concedes, after all, that the purpose behind the Second Amendment 
was not to bolster or recognize an individual right to personal self-
defense, but to ensure the availability of state militias.42  And those 
militias were threatened not because the federal government might 
be overzealous about crime control, but because the new Constitu-
tion granted Congress the power “to provide for organizing, arming 
 
 39 See Jamal Greene, On the Origins of Originalism, 88 TEX. L. REV. 1, 63–64 (2009) (discussing 
how originalism is in part a product of the degree to which Americans revere the drafters 
of the Constitution). 
 40 ROBERT H. BORK, THE TEMPTING OF AMERICA:  THE POLITICAL SEDUCTION OF THE LAW 163 
(1990). 
 41 See Saul Cornell, The Ironic Second Amendment, 1 ALB. GOV’T L. REV. 292, 294–95 (2008) 
(arguing that a living constitution view of the Second Amendment, rather than an origi-
nalist view, lends the most support to an individual rights position). 
 42 See Dist. of Columbia v. Heller, 128 S. Ct. 2783, 2801 (2008) (recognizing that the Second 
Amendment’s preamble “announces the purpose for which the right was codified:  to 
prevent elimination of the militia”). 
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and disciplining the militia.”43  Remarkably few contemporaneous 
statements during the ratifying period for the Constitution or for the 
Bill of Rights suggest that anyone of consequence believed the Amer-
ican people were raising to constitutional heights an individual right 
to personal self-defense. 
By contrast, it is eminently reasonable to infer that the right had 
reached those heights by the time of the Civil War.  To cite but one of 
many possible data points, in his floor statement introducing the 
Fourteenth Amendment to the Senate, Jacob Howard declared that 
section one of the Amendment was designed to apply against the 
states “the personal rights guaranteed and secured by the first eight 
amendments of the Constitution; such as . . . the right to keep and 
bear arms.”44  Last term, the Supreme Court relied on that and other 
evidence to hold that the Second Amendment is incorporated against 
state governments.45  Second Amendment incorporation would have 
been conceptually awkward at the founding, as the Amendment was 
designed to protect state prerogatives, but it was no longer odd by 
Reconstruction.  Since it is unthinkable within our contemporary 
constitutional culture that most individual rights could bind state 
governments but not the federal government, it is sensible for non-
originalists to consider Heller’s outcome perfectly justifiable as of 
1868.  And although the Court had never before Heller invalidated a 
gun control regulation on Second Amendment grounds, the individ-
ual rights view simpliciter was and remains extremely popular, and the 
District of Columbia’s handgun ban was widely viewed as the strictest 
ordinance in the Nation.  There is ample fodder for an opinion stat-
ing that, whatever one’s view of the founding era, the Second 
Amendment has become an individual right-protecting provision that 
the Supreme Court must respect as such.46 
Yet originalism has retained its hold on the Second Amendment, 
and Chief Justice Roberts assigned the Heller opinion to the Court’s 
most notorious originalist.47  One can easily imagine at least two po-
 
 43 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 15. 
 44 CONG. GLOBE, 39TH CONG., 1ST SESS. 2765–66 (May 23, 1866). 
 45 See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3033 n.9 (2010) (citing statements by 
Howard, John Bingham, and Thaddeus Stevens to suggest that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment was contemporaneously understood as incorporating the Bill of Rights). 
 46 Cf. Missouri v. Holland, 252 U.S. 416, 433 (1920) (arguing that constitutional interpreta-
tion “must be considered in the light of our whole experience and not merely in that of 
what was said [during the framing era]”). 
 47 See Sanford Levinson, Why Didn’t the Supreme Court Take My Advice in the Heller Case?  Some 
Speculative Responses to an Egocentric Question, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 1491, 1500–02 (2009) 
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tential analytic progressions that might lead to a marriage of gun 
rights and originalism.  The first progression goes:  (1) originalism is 
the correct approach to constitutional interpretation; and (2) an ori-
ginalist approach leads to the individual rights view; and therefore 
(3) the individual rights view is correct.  This is the idealized progres-
sion of legal analysis, and I have already suggested that it is suspect 
standing alone.  A second progression goes:  (1) the individual rights 
view is normatively desirable; and (2) an originalist approach leads to 
the individual rights view; therefore, (3) originalism is correct.  This 
is the idealized progression of much political science analysis, and 
again, I have suggested that it is suspect standing alone. 
This paper suggests a third progression.  Although our coding 
does not overlap precisely with that of Kahan and Braman—and in-
deed theirs does not map onto that of other cultural theorists48—the 
originalists in our sample have remarkably similar profiles to the gun-
rights proponents in theirs.  Kahan and Braman identify those with 
egalitarian and hierarchical orientations as most likely to oppose gun 
control.  The GSS questions Kahan and Braman used to place res-
pondents on their hierarchy-egalitarian scale are likely to identify 
moral traditionalists and libertarians as much as it is those who be-
lieve in equality as it is conventionally understood and discussed.  The 
six questions asked about views on the death penalty, interracial mar-
riage, same-sex intimacy, belief in traditional gender roles, and the 
appropriate levels of government spending on (1) “[i]mproving the 
conditions of Blacks” and (2) “[t]he military, armaments, and de-
fense.”49  The GSS questions Kahan and Braman used to identify indi-
vidualists, which probed views on the appropriate levels of govern-
ment spending on a number of other public goods, are also likely to 
capture a similar population to those who score highly libertarian on 
our government size index. 
Consider, then, the following progression:  (1) I have a morally 
traditionalist or libertarian/localist orientation; and therefore (2) 
originalism is the correct approach to constitutional interpretation 
and the individual rights view is normatively desirable; and therefore 
(3) it is difficult to countenance an argument that originalism does 
 
(wondering why Chief Justice Roberts chose an originalist to write such an important and 
potentially divisive opinion). 
 48 See Mary Douglas, Being Fair to Hierarchists, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1349, 1349 (2003) (criti-
quing the use of cultural theory of risk to analyze public opinion on gun control because 
of the difficulties in excluding bias in developing a survey that is intended to demonstrate 
individual attitudes towards gun control). 
 49 Kahan & Braman, supra note 19, app. at 1326. 
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not support the individual rights view or that gun rights are better 
justified under a different approach.  This progression identifies a 
kind of moral traditionalism or libertarianism as an omitted variable 
that leads the decider to support both originalism and gun rights, 
and recruits an account of cognitive dissonance to explain why the 
two go hand-in-hand.  It neither adopts wholesale the fictions of tra-
ditional legal analysis, nor assumes any bad faith on the part of partic-
ipants in legal debate.  Under this approach, originalist supporters of 
the individual rights view may experience their arguments—which 
are not independently persuasive—as having legal integrity (as may 
non-originalist opponents of the individual rights view). 
Participants within the conservative legal movement have, through 
their rhetoric, powerfully reinforced the underlying connection be-
tween gun rights and originalism.  In a 1997 speech, Charlton Heston 
told gun owners: 
You are a casualty of the cultural warfare being waged against tradi-
tional American freedom of beliefs and ideas. . . . Rank-and-file Ameri-
cans wake up every morning, increasingly bewildered and confused at 
why their views make them lesser citizens.  After enough breakfast-table 
TV promos hyping tattooed sex-slaves on the next Rikki Lake show, 
enough gun-glutted movies and tabloid talk shows, enough revisionist 
history books and prime-time ridicule of religion, enough of the TV anc-
hor who cocks her pretty head, clucks her tongue and sighs about guns 
causing crime and finally the message gets through:  Heaven help the 
God-fearing, law-abiding, Caucasian, middle class, Protestant, or—even 
worse—NRA-card-carrying, average working stiff, or—even worse—male 
working stiff, because not only don’t you count, you’re a downright ob-
stacle to social progress. . . . 
Although my years are long, I was not on hand to help pen the Bill of 
Rights.  And popular assumptions aside, the same goes for the Ten 
Commandments.  Yet as an American and as a man who believes in God’s 
almighty power, I treasure both. 
The Constitution was handed down to guide us by a bunch of those 
wise old dead white guys who invented this country.  Now, some flinch 
when I say that.  Why?  It’s true . . . they were white guys.  So were most of 
the guys who died in Lincoln’s name opposing slavery in the 1860s.  So 
why should I be ashamed of white guys?  Why is ‘Hispanic pride’ or ‘black 
pride’ a good thing, while ‘white pride’ conjures up shaved heads and 
white hoods?  Why was the Million Man March on Washington celebrated 
in the media as progress, while the Promise Keepers March on Washing-
ton was greeted with suspicion and ridicule?  I’ll tell you why:  cultural 
warfare. . . . 
Mainstream America is depending on you—counting on you—to 
draw your sword and fight for them.  These people have precious little 
time or resources to battle misguided Cinderella attitudes, the fringe 
propaganda of the homosexual coalition, the feminists who preach that 
it’s a divine duty for women to hate men, blacks who raise a militant fist 
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with one hand while they seek preference with the other, and all the 
New-Age apologists for juvenile crime, who see roving gangs as a means 
of adolescent merchandising, violence as a form of entertainment for 
impressionable minds, and gun bans as a means to lord-knows-what.  
We’ve reached that point in time when our national social policy origi-
nates on Oprah.  I say it’s time to pull the plug.50 
I have quoted at some length, but even a snippet would have suf-
ficed to get a flavor for the overriding themes:  traditional morality; 
Christianity; race; crime-control; gender roles; anti-elitism; victim-
hood; self-reliance; and “rank-and-file” Americans.  Heston does not, 
of course, speak for all gun rights proponents or all originalists.  But 
his speech is emblematic of the message, at times subliminal and at 
times more overt, that joins these communities at the hip.  
When we recognize originalism as an expressive idiom as much as 
a methodology, we can better predict its archetypal (though by no 
means exclusive) speakers.  They are traditionalists, comfortable with 
inherited social stratification and suspicious of the efforts of elites 
both inside and outside of government to alter it.  They associate de-
construction and relativism with destruction of a successful social or-
der and loss of moral grounding.  They disdain loose morals and 
condescension in equal measure. 
CONCLUSION 
This paper has offered, briefly, the end of a story, not the begin-
ning.  Culture is not exogenous to the political and social movements 
that affiliate with and make use of it.  Linking a professional practice 
like originalism to a matrix of expressive values is work and requires a 
degree of agency.  I have sought to expose the dynamics of one par-
ticular reconciliation of typically conservative instincts towards forms 
of constitutional originalism with Friedman’s claim that the Court 
generally responds to public opinion.  Public opinion may not only 
create the need for a legitimation strategy, but it may substantively 
engage and shape the strategy itself.  The cultural orientation that so-
cial and political organizers tap into in promoting gun rights is simi-
lar to the one “methodological” entrepreneurs tap into in promoting 
originalism.  Over time, the two outcomes may become pervasively 
linked in the public mind, not to mention the judicial one.  Whether 
or not an originalist justification for individual gun rights is the best 
 
50  Charlton Heston, First Vice President, National Rifle Association, Speech at the Free 
Congress Foundation’s 20th Anniversary Gala (Dec. 7, 1997), available at 
http://www.vpc.org/nrainfo/speech.html. 
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one, it may have been the only one the Heller majority could expe-
rience as true. 
 




The “equality” questions recorded levels of agreement with each 
of the following propositions: 
• Our society should do whatever is necessary to make sure that 
everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed. 
• We have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country. 
• One of the big problems in this country is that we don’t give 
everyone an equal chance. 
• This country would be better off if we worried less about how 
equal people are. 
• It is not really a big problem if some people have more of a 
chance in life than others. 
• If people were treated more equally in this country we would 
have many fewer problems. 
 
The “moral traditionalism” questions recorded levels of agreement 
with each of the following propositions: 
• The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of 
moral behavior to those changes. 
• The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our 
society. 
• We should be more tolerant of people who choose to live ac-
cording to their own moral standards, even if they are very dif-
ferent from our own. 
 
The three pairs of “government size” questions were as follows: 
• The main reason government has become bigger over the 
years is because it has gotten involved in things that people 
should do for themselves OR Government has become bigger 
because the problems we face have become bigger. 
• We need a strong government to handle today’s complex eco-
nomic problems OR The free market can handle these prob-
lems without government being involved. 
• The less government, the better OR There are more things 
that government should be doing. 
 
 
 
 
 
